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The Political Economy of Non-Traditional Security: Explaining the Governance of 
Avian Influenza in Indonesia 
 
Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones 
 
Abstract 
Given the common association of non-traditional security (NTS) problems with globalisation, 
surprisingly little attention has been paid to how the political economy context of given NTS 
issues shape how they are securitised and managed in practice. We argue that security and its 
governance are always highly contested because different modes of security governance 
invariably privilege particular interests and normative agendas in state and society, which 
relate directly to the political economy. Drawing on critical political geography, we argue 
that, because NTS issues are perceived as at least potentially transnational, their securitisation 
often involves strategic attempts by actors and coalitions to ‘rescale’ their governance beyond 
the national political and institutional arenas, into new, expert-dominated modes of 
governance. Such efforts are often resisted by other coalitions, for which this rescaling is 
deleterious. As evidenced by a case study of avian influenza in Indonesia, particular 
governance outcomes depend upon the nature of the coalitions assembled for and against 
rescaling in specific situations, while these coalitions’ make-up and relative strength is 
shaped by the political economy of the industries that rescaling would affect, viewed against 
the broader backdrop of state-society relations.  
 
Introduction 
In recent decades, non-traditional security (NTS) problems, such as infectious disease, 
environmental degradation, climate change, transnational terrorism, and irregular migration, 
have shifted onto the centre of the security agenda for many states and international 
organisations (White House 2002; EU 2003; United Nations 2004). Unlike more traditional 
security concerns, which focus on state survival and inter-state warfare, NTS issues are 
mostly trans-national, or at least potentially so, threatening not so much the state’s own 
survival but its perceived capacity to protect citizens’ lives and livelihoods. For many 
policymakers and analysts, the recent prominence of these issues on the security agenda 
stems largely from the acceleration of economic globalisation processes, particularly since 
the end of the Cold War. On the one hand, it is often acknowledged that the end of the Cold 
War has undermined the sense of ‘ontological security’ – the knowledge of what to expect – 
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rendering policymakers and citizens more attuned to other security threats and risks (Giddens 
1991: 35-69). On the other hand, it is commonly argued that the intensification of global 
economic flows imposes real and very serious pressures on the natural world, producing 
unintended ‘externalities’ in the form of severe environmental problems or the emergence of 
deadly new pathogens (Beck 1992; Elbe 2008; Davis 2005). Furthermore, the transportation 
and communication technologies that enable economic globalisation are seen to afford new 
opportunities for transnational terrorist and criminal groups to organise and strike (Libicki 
2001).  
 It therefore seems clear that many of the issues considered as NTS threats have crucial 
economic dimensions, as these are seen to be the direct or indirect consequence of economic 
activities, and as impacting upon the economy in turn. It logically follows that efforts at 
managing these issues will potentially have significant effects on the economic activities 
concerned, possibly challenging existing accumulation regimes and attendant social and 
political power structures. Surprisingly, however, so far, there has been little systematic 
investigation of how this political economy context may shape how NTS problems are 
understood and managed.  
 This paper seeks to redress this significant gap in security studies. We begin from the 
premise that the meaning of ‘security’ in given situations is not empirically given, but 
socially and politically constructed (McDonald 2008; Buzan et al. 1998). Security’s meaning 
and governance are typically hotly contested issues. This is because depicting something as a 
‘security’ problem – (potentially) constituting an existential threat to something else – and the 
associated creation of particular forms of security governance, is not neutral, but invariably 
privileges the interests and/or normative agendas of particular societal groups over others. 
What emerges in practice is therefore shaped by conflicts between contending socio-political 
coalitions. The forces in struggle, and outcome of their conflict, are in turn powerfully shaped 
by the political economy context and broader social power relations. Securitisation and 
security governance in general are thus always conditioned by structural forces and conflicts, 
but this is perhaps particularly true of NTS issues since their relationship to the economy 
means that efforts to alter their governance is likely to agitate important societal groups.  
Struggles over NTS governance also take a qualitatively different form to those 
relating to traditional, inter-state security. Because of the transnational or potentially 
transnational nature of NTS issues, the question of scale is at the core of the politics of their 
securitisation. Traditional securitisation reinforces the organisation of world politics along 
states’ territorial boundaries. With NTS the spatial scope of the matters involved, and hence 
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how these issues should be governed and by whom, are less determinate. The emergence of a 
deadly new pathogen in a Southeast Asian village, for example, could be treated as a local, 
provincial, national, regional or even global problem. Shifting the scale at which this 
outbreak is governed will open up political and economic opportunities for some actors while 
foreclosing them for others. Indeed, the claim that transnational NTS problems are beyond 
the capacity of individual states to manage underpins the attempt by coalitions to rescale their 
governance from (sub)national political and institutional arenas to newly established modes 
of governance, within which experts who are not politically or popularly accountable 
dominate. Such efforts are often resisted by others, for whom this rescaling is deleterious. 
Again, these struggles are embedded within the broader political economy context. 
This article’s first section identifies the gaps in the literature regarding the political 
economy of security governance and introduces our framework. We then present a case study 
of a prominent NTS threat: the effort to prevent the spread of H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian 
Influenza (HPAI), focusing on Indonesia, the site of most international attention. Avian 
influenza has been subject to considerable securitisation and rescaling efforts in recent years 
but, we demonstrate, the outcomes have been fundamentally shaped by the nature of the 
coalitions assembled to support and resist rescaling and the struggles between them, which 
are in turn conditioned by the political economy of the poultry industry. This case also 
illustrates the importance of the broader context of capitalist development and state-society 
relations, notably the impact of decentralisation since 2001.  
 
The Politics and Governance of Non-Traditional Security 
The link between the growing prominence of NTS and the spread of economic globalisation 
is now seen as axiomatic by both mainstream and critical commentators. Governments often 
highlight the growing vulnerability of societies, fostered by the intensification of economic 
flows across borders, to problems such as terrorism, crime and climate change, referring to 
such challenges as the ‘dark side of globalisation’ (G-8 1999). Security analysts and critics 
raise similar concerns about the impact of globalisation on security and states’ ability to 
protect citizens. Emmers (2004: 1), for example, says of NTS issues like ‘environmental 
concerns, infectious disease and transnational crime’ that ‘the process of globalization has 
significantly amplified their spread and impact and accelerated their significance’. In turn, 
Dupont (2001: 30) warns, such threats ‘have the capacity to compromise the economic 
foundation of the state’. Given such ubiquitous linking of NTS with globalisation, there has 
been surprisingly little systematic exploration of the political economy of security 
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governance. Since NTS issues clearly are related, at least indirectly, to economic activities, 
what is the relationship between the political economy of the industries affected through 
efforts to manage NTS threats and the actual form of governance that emerges to manage 
these issues? This section outlines our approach to this question, theorising the politics of 
NTS as the contested rescaling of the spaces, instruments and discourses of security in 
alignment with the strategies, interests and ideologies of key actors in state and society.  
As the introduction to this special issue argues, surprisingly little extant work in 
mainstream International Relations explores the relationship between political economy and 
NTS and its governance. The literature, whether adopting a realist or 
constructivist/poststructuralist ontology, has been occupied with different questions and 
research agendas and has therefore neglected this very important dimension of security 
politics. Consequently, in order to address these questions we adapt tools and frameworks 
from critical political economy and political geography that have hitherto rarely been used in 
the security context.  
Realist scholars and policy-oriented empiricists who do not problematise the concept 
of ‘security’ have primarily been concerned with evaluating the severity of security threats in 
particular situations and advocating suitable policy responses (e.g. Dupont 2001). Although 
critical scholars adopting an empiricist lens, like Davis (2005), have, for example, decried the 
role of greedy corporations in exacerbating NTS problems such as H5N1, this analysis has 
not extended to a sustained, theoretically informed, examination of how political economy 
shapes both securitisation efforts and their governance outcomes in particular situations.  
Scholars who understand security as being socially constructed adopt frameworks that 
are potentially more open to considering political economy issues, but in practice shy away 
from interrogating them. Constructivists have used the ‘securitisation’ framework to describe 
how problems become identified as ‘security’ matters, emphasising the inter-subjective 
nature of this process, which involves actors discursively identifying something as a ‘threat’ 
to some referent object (Buzan et al. 1998). This approach could potentially consider how 
political economy contexts shape this process and, indeed, reference is made to the 
‘facilitating conditions’ that enable successful securitisation (ibid: 31-33). Unfortunately, 
however, these conditions are never satisfactorily delineated (McDonald 2008). Moreover, 
because securitisation is fundamentally defined as a ‘speech act’ (Buzan et al. 1998), 
constructivists have tended to focus on changes in discourse – the ‘grammar of security’ and 
the language of ‘threat’ – while neglecting the material context in which such changes occur 
(or do not occur), and how this context shapes subsequent attempts to govern the issue. Many 
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constructivist studies consequently describe and/or criticise discursive strategies of threat-
construction, yet largely neglect to explore how the identification and management of NTS 
issues are shaped by the interests of powerful industries and social forces (cf. Jones 2011). 
This is a crucial weakness because it leaves them unable to adequately account for – rather 
than simply lament – the lack of meaningful action often observed despite the discursive 
identification of threats (e.g. Caballero-Anthony 2008). 
Poststructuralist scholarship suffers from a similar weakness. Here, the ‘Paris School’ 
has emphasised the role of professional networks of security agencies in shaping threat- and 
risk-perception through their position as experts and their institutional capacities to create and 
govern borders, and to define and manage threats (CASE Collective 2006). Again, this 
approach underscores the contested nature of securitisation and security governance. 
However, their narrow focus on the ‘field’ of security professionals leads them to neglect the 
broader socio-political and economic context in which this field is necessarily embedded and 
which conditions the operation and autonomy of security agencies.  
While accepting that securitisation and security governance are inherently contested, 
we therefore need to elaborate on the fundamental nature of this contestation and situate it 
within its relevant context. Firstly, efforts to govern NTS issues always involve the crucial 
issue of scale. These issues are inherently seen as trans-national in nature, which in turn 
necessitates management approaches that go beyond established, national-level governance. 
Typical is Mittelman’s (2010: 164) claim that  
Nontraditional threats, including climate change, pandemics, transnational 
crime, and cross-border terror emanate from above and below the nation-state. 
Thus, there cannot be a neat separation between national and global security. 
Nor is there a sharp division between internal and external security.  
Efforts to securitise and govern NTS threats consequently problematise the centrality of 
national governance and the idea that world politics is conducted along national territorial 
boundaries. As Mische (1989: 394-6) puts it in relation to environmental security, ‘the Earth 
does not recognise security as we know it... The sovereignty of the Earth is indivisible.’ The 
US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS 2005: H-60) similarly states: ‘Since 
pandemics are diseases without borders, the influenza virus will not respect political or 
geographic boundaries—a threat against one nation is a threat against the entire world’. 
Claims like this typically accompany efforts to rescale the governance of NTS to a sub-
regional, regional or global level which, it is argued, better fits the challenges. 
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 Although these arguments are seen as commonsensical in many academic and policy 
circles, IR scholars have thus far neglected to systematically evaluate the significance of scale 
for the manner in which particular transnational security issues are understood and managed. 
As critical political geographers have long recognised, the scale at which any issue is 
governed is never neutral and is consequently subject to political contestation. Power 
relationships run through the construction of space and, in turn, the spatial organisation of 
political and economic governance helps (re)produce particular power relations in society 
(Harvey 2006).  Accordingly, whether a political issue is defined as urban/local, provincial, 
national, regional, global, and so on, is not neutral but, because each scale involves different 
configurations of actors, resources and political opportunity structures, always privileges 
certain societal interests and values over others. Together with the nature of the coalitions 
that organise around various scalar framings, it is one of the most important factors that 
determine the outcome of social and political conflicts over a given issue. Precisely because 
the scale of governance matters so much, actors will typically attempt to rescale issues as a 
way of (re)producing particular power relations favourable to themselves and their allies, 
while others will resist such efforts if they are deleterious to them (see Gibson 2005). Though 
the study of territorial politics typically focuses on struggles within one state, there is no 
reason why the governance of particular issues cannot be rescaled to levels beyond state 
borders: there is no ‘initial moment that creates a framework or container within which future 
struggles are played out’ (Brenner and Elden 2009: 367). These strategies are constrained by 
existing institutional arrangements, including established international borders and 
international law, which in themselves are manifestations of earlier contested processes of 
territorialisation (see Tilly 1992).  
The presentation of NTS issues like infectious diseases as ‘transnational security’ 
problems is itself to insist on governing them outside of national frameworks, although not 
necessarily by non-state actors. This often implicates the transformation of state apparatuses 
themselves as they are reworked into networks of transnational or regional governance. If 
successful, rescaling in practice typically means establishing functional regulatory forms of 
network or multilevel governance, in which experts and professionals are given authority. 
This is because such transnational problems are often presented as requiring specialised 
forms of technical, scientific and/or managerial expertise to identify and manage them 
properly. However, whether this process should occur and how far it occurs in practice is 
likely to be subject to intense political contestation between groups of actors whose interests 
and ideologies are differentially advanced at different scales.  
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Contextually, this scalar politics is embedded within and conditioned by political 
economy and wider state-society relations in a number of ways. Identifying a given issue as a 
security threat and seeking to rescale its governance frequently touches – directly or 
indirectly – on the specific interests of particular industries. Seeking to interdict transnational 
terrorist financing affects banking and financial institutions; containing the spread of animal-
to-human disease affects livestock industries; tackling pollution threatens the operations of 
polluting industries. In any given case, how particular sectors and segments of industry relate 
to the issue and how rescaling security governance will affect their interests will shape 
whether they will promote or oppose such moves, and how. Their success in doing so 
depends on the broader political economy and state-society relations. Where an industry (or 
part of it) is dominant, is able to form broad alliances, or has privileged access to state 
institutions, it may be able to successfully promote, resist or curtail rescaling, or limit 
rescaling to less powerful sections of the sector and society. Its capacity to do so is likely to 
turn on factors like the industry’s contribution to the domestic economy and state revenues, 
its perceived importance in relation to ideological goals like ‘national development’, and its 
specific, historically constituted relationship with the state and key agencies and groups 
within it. 
Business interests’ specific relationship to states matter because states retain an 
important role in security governance, not least as ‘scale managers’, their formal sovereignty 
and institutional capacities giving them considerable influence over the level at which issues 
are governed (Mahon and Keil 2009). Access to state apparatuses varies considerably and is 
itself shaped by broader political economy and social power relations. As Marxist and social 
conflict theorists have long argued, state forms reflect conflicts and compromises among 
historically specific socio-political coalitions rooted primarily in the political economy – 
classes, class fractions, distributional coalitions and other societal groups (Poulantzas 1978; 
Jessop 2008). As a result, states exhibit ‘strategic selectivity’, being more open to some 
forces pursuing certain strategies than others (Jessop 2008). This selectivity varies over time 
and space, but the enhanced access of national and transnational capital to state institutions is 
a widely observed feature of neoliberal globalisation (Harvey 2005). Where privileged state 
access exists, it may allow corporate interests to exercise considerable influence over the 
politics of rescaling. Furthermore, because states are not coherent, unitary actors (Migdal 
2001), strategic selectivity varies across state apparatuses. Societal interests threatened by 
rescaling efforts from one state agency may thus mobilise allies located in another. Finally, 
even when partial rescaling occurs, powerful and well-resourced groups may constrain the 
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practical functioning of rescaled state apparatuses by, for example, corrupting important 
officials or other forms of regulatory capture. 
 To summarise, we see the central aspect of the politics of NTS as being the 
contestation over the scale at which a given issue should be governed, and the related 
struggles over the mechanisms through which it is to be governed, and the kinds of actors 
tasked with governing this issue. How far an issue is ‘securitised’ and how it is managed in 
practice will depend on conflicts between contending coalitions seeking to secure a scalar 
governance arrangement that best fits their interests and ideologies. These coalitions are 
largely rooted in the political economy context of which they are part. This context, and the 
broader pattern of state-society relations, conditions the struggle between these coalitions and 
also shapes the way in which governance regimes operate in practice.  
 
Non-Traditional Security Governance in Indonesia 
We now proceed to present a case study of the governance of the H5N1 virus, focusing on 
Indonesia, which is seen as the dominant origin of this transnational security threat. We begin 
with a general description of Indonesia’s political economy and state-society relations, 
highlighting the legacy of state-led development and decentralisation as particularly 
important factors for our analysis. The case study is then presented. In an effort to tackle 
H5N1, local level animal health services have been subjected to rescaling efforts, mainly by 
international actors, often in coalition with some Indonesian groups, within and beyond the 
state, in order to mitigate a problem seen to have serious global implications. The outcomes 
of these efforts have been considerably shaped by the political economy of the poultry 
industry and broader societal power relations in Indonesia. Some rescaling has occurred, but 
mainly for ‘backyard’ poultry owners, while the regulation of the commercial poultry sector 
has been undermined by the power of organised business interests, particularly those 
entrenched within the country’s devolved administrations. This has produced a highly uneven 
governance regime and, given that the commercial sector is actually the primary source of 
H5N1, arguably a rather ineffective one. 
 
The Indonesian Context: Political Economy and State-Society Relations 
Contemporary Indonesian governance is most powerfully shaped by the legacy of the Suharto 
regime, which secured non-communist social order during the Cold War through coercion, 
state-led development, and the construction of a gigantic patronage network centred on 
President Suharto himself. Indonesia’s progressive social forces were either destroyed or 
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repressed, with over a million leftists slaughtered in 1965-1966, left-wing parties and trade 
unions outlawed, and others subjected to persistent repression. With extensive Western 
support, Suharto consolidated a military-backed dictatorship centred on nationalism and the 
cultivation of a depoliticised ‘floating mass’. He secured the loyalty of powerful groups – 
particularly the military, urban elites and the economically dominant (but politically weak) 
ethnic-Chinese bourgeoisie – by dispensing government contracts, natural resource 
concessions, subsidies and other privileges, assisted by World Bank aid and oil revenues 
(Robison 1986). In turn, politico-bureaucratic elites received kickbacks and often developed 
their own business interests. Consequently, by the late 1980s, big business had exceptional 
access to, and increasingly instrumental control over, the state apparatus, while other societal 
groups were politically weak and disorganised.  
 The skewed economic development produced by Suharto’s strategy of rule reinforced 
this distribution of social power and deepened the state’s structural dependence on capital. 
Indonesia has certainly experienced rapid economic growth: its gross domestic product 
(GDP) was US$878.2bn by 2012, giving its population of 234m – the world’s fourth largest – 
an average per capita income of US$3,563, which places Indonesia in the ‘middle income’ 
bracket. However, income inequality is stark: half the population lives along the poverty line, 
while the top 20 percent control nearly half the country’s wealth and the 40 richest oligarchs 
have amassed assets equal to one-tenth of Indonesia’s GDP (World Bank 2013; Sinaga 2012; 
von Luebke 2011). Similarly, the rent-seeking model of development promoted by Suharto 
concentrated economic power in primary sectors dominated by favoured conglomerates, 
notably logging, mining and agriculture. Today, these sectors still account for over a quarter 
of GDP and more than 36 percent of employment, while manufacturing comprises under 24 
percent and 13 percent respectively (Bank Indonesia 2013; Statistics Indonesia 2013). This 
developmental trajectory has made political elites dependent on big business for party 
financing and securing employment and economic growth, giving them little incentive to 
confront corporate power or to serve the interests of the disadvantaged. As we discuss below, 
this broader pattern is replicated in the poultry industry. 
 This legacy has strongly conditioned Indonesia’s post-Suharto trajectory. Although 
the authoritarian, oligarchic form of patrimonialism Suharto established was shaken by the 
1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, the emergence of a reformasi (reform) movement, and 
Suharto’s forced resignation, dominant forces were largely able to reorganise themselves 
within the country’s new democratic institutions (Robison and Hadiz 2004). At the national 
level, there is now greater competition for office, but political parties are mainly ‘Trojan 
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horses’ for the pre-existing elite to sustain access to political and economic power (Tan 
2006). ‘Money politics’ predominates, with the parties highly dependent on financing by 
business magnates and ‘donations’ channelled upwards from the districts and provinces. 
Although the military has been somewhat sidelined, it retains significant influence, 
particularly in restive provinces like West Papua. Senior and retired military and police 
officers often have their own business interests and the security forces have always relied on 
business, including illegal, activities to generate significant proportions of their operating 
costs (International Crisis Group 2001). Unsurprisingly, corruption remains endemic, with 
wealthy and well-connected interests frequently able to pervert state institutions to their own 
end, including by corrupting judicial processes. Despite greater civil liberties and media 
freedoms, counter-hegemonic forces remain relatively weak and disorganised, unable to 
seriously challenge the grip of politico-business complexes over state power. 
From the perspective of the politics of scale, however, one very significant change 
since Suharto’s fall has been governmental decentralisation. Decentralisation, implemented 
from 2001, was promoted by the International Financial Institutions following the Asian 
financial crisis, which left the Indonesian government temporarily highly dependent upon 
external assistance. It was embraced by the relatively weak post-Suharto government as a 
means of attracting regional support. However, to avoid potentially fuelling separatist 
regionalism, authority was delegated to the very local level of districts (kabupaten) and cities. 
The previous patronage regime, centred on Suharto and Jakarta, had fostered a considerable 
degree of loyalty to the central state, permitting a reasonable degree of governmental control 
from the capital. Today, however, the power to issue licences and permits and distribute 
critical resources such as agricultural land has been largely delegated to district regents 
(bupatis), permitting the emergence of localised, smaller-scale patronage networks. Forces 
nurtured by Suharto’s New Order were well-placed to struggle for control over these local 
resources and have since entrenched themselves at the district and the (less powerful) 
provincial levels (Hadiz 2010). Consequently, the interests of these local politico-business 
elites are no longer necessarily aligned with those prevailing in Jakarta. National political 
parties now often rely on their local bosses to funnel money upwards to them, while national 
line ministries frequently find themselves powerless to act at the local level. Territorial 
political struggles have emerged as rival elites located at different scales contest control over 
issues and budgets (Hadiz 2010).  
In this context, forces resisting the rescaling of the governance of security issues that 
could damage their interests have often done so by trying to constrain their governance to the 
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district or provincial level where their influence is strongest, although continued corporate 
influence on the central state also restrains any thrusts towards rescaling. Conversely, certain 
national agencies have selectively embraced international interventions around NTS issues in 
an effort to bolster the territorial and functional reach of their authority, often in alliance with 
other groups, within and outside the state. 
 
Case Study: Governing H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza 
H5N1 is a highly pathogenic variant of the influenza virus, typically found in poultry. The 
main concern from a public health perspective is that, following a cross-species transmission, 
the virus could evolve to become easily transmissible between humans, sparking a global 
pandemic. Although H5N1 has not yet developed this capacity, few other pathogens have 
been presented by governments and international organisations as a greater threat to global 
health security (e.g. WHO 2007: 47; World Bank 2008: 10). The British Civil Contingency 
Secretariat, for example, claimed H5N1 was ‘as serious a threat as terrorism’ (Lean 2005).  
The concern with preventing a H5N1 pandemic was also translated into a substantial 
monetary commitment: during 2006, donors allocated US$2.38bn for programs of 
surveillance, prevention, containment and vaccine development. Although H5N1 has rarely 
hit headlines since 2008, it remains a key focus of pandemic preparedness plans worldwide. 
As the epicentre of the worst outbreaks, Southeast Asia has been at the forefront of 
international efforts to prevent the emergence and spread of H5N1. In 2007, H5N1 was 
identified as one of the region’s three most significant transnational challenges to security, 
stability and peace (ASEAN 2007). There is, however, a yawning gap between such urgent 
rhetoric of securitisation and the manner in which the disease has been managed in practice 
(Caballero-Anthony 2008). Southeast Asia’s diverse national responses have been 
considerably shaped by the particular interaction between international programs and/or 
regulatory standards and the constellation of socio-political forces supporting or resisting 
these at various scales. Indonesia proves a case in point.  
With 161 of 193 confirmed cases (as of March 2013), Indonesia has the highest 
number of human fatalities from bird flu. No country has been given more international 
assistance to combat H5N1, receiving an estimated US$138m of the US$175m earmarked for 
such programs (Charnoz and Forster 2011: 67). The most significant and best-funded facet of 
the international effort to manage H5N1 in Indonesia has been the rescaling of sub-national 
animal and human health services, so that these would provide ongoing grassroots 
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surveillance of H5N1 outbreaks and the capacity to respond where necessary. Originally, in 
line with decentralisation, the responsibility for animal and public health lay with the 
districts. However, with the securitisation of H5N1, expert international organisations 
promoted the expansion and rescaling of health governance, notably via the Food and 
Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Participatory Disease Surveillance and Response (PDSR) 
programme in animal health, and the WHO’s District Surveillance Officers (DSO) 
programme in human health. They sought to shift health governance both ‘upwards’ to the 
regional and national levels and ‘sideways’, into the hands of like-minded experts who would 
implement international-standard regulatory practices. This created a complex, multi-level 
governance system that was substantially internationalised. 
At the local level, the PDSR and DSO programs often created health governance 
systems where none had hitherto existed. These programs essentially involved training and 
empowering veterinarians and health officials to conduct local surveillance to detect 
outbreaks of H5N1 and educate local populations on the risks of transmission. PDSR was the 
largest single H5N1-related international project in Indonesia. Despite a relatively modest 
budget by international standards of approximately US$30m from 2005-2012, it had an 
extensive impact on the ground, due to Indonesia’s low labour costs: 
From January 2006 to September 2008, PDSR teams, comprising over 2,000 
trained veterinarians and para-veterinarians, conducted over 177,300 
surveillance visits, detected 6,011 outbreaks of avian influenza in 324 districts, 
and met with over two million poultry farmers and community members… In 
May 2009, there were 15 international and 60 national staff/consultants 
employed by FAO, with a majority of them supporting the PDSR programme 
(Charnoz and Forster 2011: 69).  
 At the provincial level, Local Disease Control Centres were established. District-level 
PDSR staff reported suspected outbreaks to these centres, which brought together local PDSR 
and DSO personnel with national officials from the Ministries of Health (MoH) and 
Agriculture (MoA), plus international officials from the FAO and WHO. The centres 
mobilised rapid response teams to investigate reports and respond to outbreaks as required.   
 At the national level the PDSR system was coordinated by a Campaign Management 
Unit within the MoA’s Directorate-General of Livestock Services, which FAO consultants 
helped design and staff. Furthermore, a dedicated National Committee was established in 
2006 to oversee the implementation of a National Strategic Work Plan to combat H5N1. This 
ministerial-level committee, known as Komnas FBPI, was chaired by the Coordinating 
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Minister for People’s Welfare and also included the ministers of health, agriculture, forestry, 
national planning, and industry, the Coordinating Minister for Economics, the commander of 
the armed forces, the police chief, and the chair of the Indonesian Red Cross. Its six task-
forces of scientists and other experts were tasked with directing policies on research and 
development, animal health, human health, vaccine and anti-viral medicines, mass 
communications and public information (Forster 2010: 145).  
Ostensibly, then, H5N1 was quite dramatically securitised and its governance 
centralised through a set of crisis-management institutions, shifted into the hands of technical 
experts, and significantly internationalised. Programs like PDSR created or expanded local 
health services and established new governance networks across the local and national scales 
in Indonesia, with the direct involvement of international actors in day-to-day health 
governance. However, the practical outcomes of this rescaling effort have been highly 
uneven. The governance of poultry disease in ‘backyard’ settings has been significantly 
rescaled in accordance with these multilevel, internationalised governance arrangements. 
However, the commercial poultry sector, which was identified from 2009 as the major site of 
the H5N1 problem, has barely been touched. To explain why, we need to consider two crucial 
factors: decentralisation and the political economy of poultry production in Indonesia. 
First, the governance of H5N1 was bound up in post-decentralisation struggles 
between different levels of the Indonesian government. Central government ministries 
selectively embraced international H5N1 projects to help rebuild the territorial and functional 
reach of their authority. Despite rhetorically accepting powerful donor states’ securitisation of 
H5N1, the disease was clearly not a genuine domestic priority, attracting just US$57m, or 1.7 
per cent of the total health budget at the peak of the crisis in 2006, to cover a population of 
234m (Curley and Herington 2011: 157). However, many central government officials 
welcomed international H5N1 program funding because it helped foster collaboration 
between key ministries and, more importantly, strengthen central government ministries vis-
à-vis district and provincial governments – recentralising some of the authority lost during 
decentralisation. Senior MoH official Indriyono (2011) recalls that this ‘helped the centre 
have a bit more control over provinces and districts. Particularly if we have the money… we 
can advocate and convince them’ since ‘resources are always a problem at the local level’. 
For the central government, therefore, the H5N1 programmes were to a significant extent 
simply a useful vehicle to reassert authority against local governments rather than simply 
being motivated by a desire to tackle the problem.1 A primary beneficiary was the MoA: 
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following decentralisation, it had virtually no control over district-level agricultural 
departments, but via the CMU it now plays a key coordinating role. 
However, this embrace of international assistance, which might have yielded 
substantial results despite its strategic nature, was nonetheless undermined because district-
level governments resisted efforts to undermine their authority by constraining the rescaling 
of the governance of H5N1, trying to keep it mainly in the hands of local animal husbandry 
officials. This resistance mattered because district officials constitute the human agency 
required to actually perform surveillance on the ground. As the former manager of the MoA 
Emergency Centre for Transnational and Asymmetric Threats observed, ‘We can’t do 
anything without the help of local governments’ (Delima Azahari 2011). One FAO official 
noted, ‘the national government has no authority to do anything... so we had to go to the local 
level’ (Brum 2011). This shaped the way PDSR was crafted and implemented, allowing local 
governments to retain considerable control over how governance actually occurred. For 
example, PDSR programme officers, despite being paid by the FAO, were always officially 
district employees. This gave bupatis considerable influence over how H5N1 would be 
governed in practice.  
Bupatis’ resistance to health governance rescaling was clearest vis-à-vis FAO efforts 
to empower government veterinarians. As with the rescaling associated with NTS issues 
more generally, PDSR attempted to quarantine an area of policymaking and implementation 
from political influence by shifting into the hands of technical experts – in this case, 
veterinarians. Historically, however, veterinary authority has been weak in Indonesia, with 
small numbers of vets tending to work beneath managers concerned more with commercial 
aspects of livestock services. Bupatis control the funding of local animal health services, and 
chronically underfund them. During decentralisation, districts carved out significant 
autonomy in the management of animal health because livestock industries generate 
significant employment and rents at the local level which they want to protect from central 
government interference. As Hadiz (2010) documents, access to rents from, or control over, 
local businesses has been crucial to the attainment and maintenance of bupatis’ political 
power in the decentralisation era. Bupatis frequently avoid regulating local businesses 
properly to protect their allies, maintain a favourable business climate, and expand local 
employment to bolster their electoral support. The poultry industry, for its part, has supported 
this decentralisation of authority as a way of avoiding tougher regulation (Charnoz and 
Forster 2011: 39, 85-86). Empowering vets to override local agricultural managers threatens 
this mutually satisfactory situation.  
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Efforts to empower vets, including through PDSR, therefore provoke serious political 
contestation. The Indonesian Veterinary Medical Association (IVMA) launched a campaign 
to establish veterinary authority over livestock services across all levels of government. After 
protracted struggles, partly stemming from H5N1-related international pressure this finally 
resulted in National Law 18/2009 on Animal Husbandry, which mandated the establishment 
of local animal health offices, and a 2010 Constitutional Court ruling that legally elevated 
veterinary authority over commercial interests. However, because bupatis remain responsible 
for funding local services, they have generally kept veterinarians weak by systematically 
under-resourcing them. In fact, in many districts, vets are not even allowed by law to enter 
commercial properties without owners’ permission. IVMA President Dr Wiwiek (2011) thus 
observes: ‘In [national] law we are strong enough, but to have the law really implemented 
and in line with OIE [World Organisation for Animal Health] guidelines we need political 
will.’  
To understand why this political will has been so unevenly applied to the problem – 
specifically, why PDSR has focused overwhelmingly on backyard rather than commercial 
poultry, and how this has constrained the regime’s efficacy – we need now to turn to the 
political economy of the poultry industry. The pattern of oligarchic domination and highly 
collusive state-capital relations discussed earlier is clearly apparent here.  
Chicken accounts for 60 percent of total meat consumption in Indonesia (Cargill 
Indonesia 2013). Although precise figures are unobtainable, the poultry industry employs the 
majority of the livestock sector’s approximately three million workers, 3 percent of the 
national workforce (Sumiarto and Arifin 2008: 6). The industry is entirely aimed at domestic 
consumption. The ten largest firms sell around one billion chickens per year, 80 percent of 
national output. However, the vast majority of broiler chicken and egg production is actually 
done by thousands of small and medium, independently owned farms, contracted to the larger 
firms (Charnoz and Forster 2011: 21, 37). These small farms are typically very basic, with 
few or no bio-security measures (Sumiarto and Arifin 2008; USAID 2009). Crucially, they 
are heavily dependent upon the major corporations. The latter provide credit to farmers – 
unavailable elsewhere – to purchase essential inputs from them, mainly day-old chicks and 
feed. The corporations exploit their market power by charging very high prices for these 
inputs; indeed, 90 percent of their profits come from this rather than selling chickens 
(Charnoz and Forster 2011: 32). The small farmers raise the chickens for one month, then sell 
them back to the corporations at pre-agreed prices. While this protects farmers from market 
price fluctuations, the exorbitant cost of inputs minimises their profit margins, keeping them 
 16 
reliant upon the corporations (USAID 2009: 19-20). Moreover, crucially, under standard 
industry contracts, farmers are not paid for dead chickens. Therefore, and also because they 
are not export-oriented, the large corporations have little exposure to the risk of poultry death 
from disease and thus little incentive to tackle H5N1 (Charnoz and Forster 2011: 37). 
Meanwhile, the economically squeezed farmers have every incentive to hide outbreaks on 
their farms and even sell dead, diseased chickens for consumption, made possible by the 
existence of a thriving market for chickens that die of unnatural causes, due to widespread 
poverty (Padmawati and Nichter 2008).    
These perverse incentives, which encourage an irresponsible approach to H5N1 
control, could be changed if large corporations vertically integrated farming into their 
operations, bringing chicken production in-house instead of outsourcing it to small farmers. 
This is the norm in Thailand. Accordingly, its response to H5N1 was radically different. 
Powerful, export-oriented and vertically integrated poultry conglomerates, which lost their 
export markets overnight following the H5N1 outbreaks, supported government-enforced 
compliance with the highest international bio-security standards to restore overseas customer 
confidence. This drove most smallholder poultry farmers – who could not afford to comply – 
out of business, further concentrating the industry in conglomerate hands. Exports 
subsequently recovered, further benefiting the conglomerates, and no human H5N1 cases 
have been recorded since 2006 (Safman 2010). Conversely, the Indonesian central 
government reportedly pressured the large companies not to integrate production to avoid 
eliminating smaller farms, fearing this would result in the politically hazardous loss of 
millions of rural jobs (Azahari 2011). Reflecting the Indonesian state’s structural dependence 
on big business to fulfil its economic goals, corporations reportedly agreed to cooperate in 
exchange for continued protection from poultry imports (Mulyanto 2011). Imports would out-
compete local produce because foreign firms use more efficient production technologies and 
Indonesian conglomerates extract massive profits from their monopolistic sale of production 
inputs (Azhar and Noeri 2011).  
Reputedly close relations between the poultry magnates and the MoA may also help 
to explain the government’s reluctance to confront the industry or local governments head-
on. Forster and Charnoz’s (2013: ao) detailed study of the sector found that many 
interviewees discussed ‘the political connections enjoyed by these large corporations, 
including through family links, as well as their capacity to “buy in” key actors through 
passive or active corruption, and to influence the removal of civil servants who are not 
sympathetic to their views.’ Indeed, the government clearly acted to conceal early H5N1 
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outbreaks, while the senior MoA bureaucrat responsible for animal health was quickly sacked 
after she exposed them (Lowe 2010). Accordingly, large corporations are disinterested in 
restructuring the industry or investing in bio-security. This even includes Indonesia’s largest 
poultry corporation, despite the fact it is a subsidiary of Thailand’s leading conglomerate, 
Charoen Pokphand. Facing different political economy contexts, the same firm’s behaviour 
radically diverges. As one industry observer argues, unsurprisingly, the private sector is 
driven solely by profits: ‘decision-making is about economic imperatives, not public health – 
public health people can’t get that’ (Anonymous 2011). 
 The interests bound up in the commercial poultry industry explain why the rescaling 
of the governance of H5N1 has been concentrated almost exclusively in the backyard poultry 
sector. Indonesia’s National Strategic Work Plan identified backyard poultry as a key 
priority, and donors supported this thrust despite the lack of supporting evidence (Forster and 
Charnoz 2013). Consequently, PDSR was entirely focused on backyard poultry until late 
2008, with only minor efforts to engage commercial producers since (Perry et al. 2009: 29). 
Thus, while vets have been empowered through PDSR to manage outbreaks of H5N1 in 
backyard poultry at all levels of government, the commercial sector has remained exempt. As 
mentioned, government vets are not even permitted by the laws of many districts to enter 
commercial premises without permission, vastly restricting the efficacy of the surveillance 
regime. Similarly, the internationally preferred policy of widespread culling in the case of 
outbreaks was rejected in favour of poultry vaccination – thus protecting the industry from 
major losses – yet, vaccination was made compulsory only for backyard chickens.  
As long as PDSR remained focused on the backyard sector, its implementation was 
very smooth, and described as an ‘iconic success in HPAI detection’ (Perry et al. 2009: 26). 
When the programme shifted towards the commercial sector, however, it has faced a great 
deal more resistance and produced feeble results. This reorientation began in late 2008, as 
evidence of the disease’s circulation in farms accumulated, and intensified following a 2009 
review which identified the commercial sector as the major source of the problem. A pilot 
project was launched in only six farms to develop cost-effective bio-security measures. It 
aims to establish trust with the industry so that farmers would allow vets to visit farms when 
outbreaks occur, as well as build the capacity of local vets to profile the commercial poultry 
industry in their area. Participation is entirely voluntary, however, and farmers are not 
enthusiastic for the reasons discussed above, primarily relating to the high cost of bio-
security. Apart from this pilot, the only international project dedicated to the commercial 
sector is the – again small-scale – USAID-funded Strategies Against Flu Emergence (SAFE). 
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SAFE bypasses government altogether, attempting to improve bio-security in small farms by 
going directly to the industry, seeking to convince big conglomerates and small farmers alike 
that better bio-security is in their material interests. They have also sought to convince the big 
corporations to include bio-security-related standards and bonuses in their contracts with 
small farmers. Yet, because the current structure of the poultry sector provides very high 
levels of profitability to the big conglomerates with minimal economic risk from disease, and 
because production is entirely for the domestic market, meaning they are not concerned with 
the perceptions of overseas consumers, they have generally shown little interest in improving 
bio-security, or in restructuring the industry as a whole. Nor, due to the industry’s 
relationship to political actors, has it come under real pressure from the state to change this 
posture.  
In summary, PDSR – the most expensive and territorially expansive of the international 
projects to manage the spread of H5N1 in Indonesia – has been a real success in rescaling and 
internationalising surveillance of H5N1 and response in backyard poultry, but a failure with 
respect to commercial farms. Local governments’ resistance to efforts to empower vets vis-à-
vis industry interests and the central government’s indifference to the spread of the disease in 
the commercial sector have meant that the attempt to rescale Indonesia’s local animal health 
systems has affected only the weakest group – backyard poultry owners, who are in fact 
victims of H5N1 circulation in the commercial sector (Perry et al. 2009). Summarising the 
situation, Agus Suwandoto (2011), prominent Indonesian scientist and former Komnas FPBI 
member, simply states: ‘regulation is regulation, but money is money.’  
 
Conclusion 
This article has sought to address a major gap in the security studies literature. Despite the 
widely held perception that NTS issues are at least indirectly related to the intensification of 
economic activities and globalisation specifically, no sustained effort has to date taken place 
to examine the relationship between the political economy of the industries affected by 
attempts to address NTS issues and the actual modes of governance that emerge. We began 
from the premise that security’s meaning and governance were typically hotly contested 
issues. Depicting something as a ‘security’ problem – (potentially) constituting an existential 
threat to something else – and the subsequent creation of particular forms of security 
governance, is not neutral, but invariably privileges the interests and/or normative agendas of 
particular societal groups over others. What emerges in practice is therefore shaped by 
conflicts between contending socio-political coalitions. The forces in struggle, and outcome 
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of their conflict, are in turn powerfully shaped by the political economy context and broader 
social power relations running through state and society. NTS issues are qualitatively distinct 
from traditional international security problems. Their perceived transnational potential often 
underpins claims that their management is beyond the capacity of individual governments. 
Therefore, the securitisation of NTS issues typically involves efforts on the part of socio-
political coalitions to rescale the state apparatuses dealing with these issues, by integrating 
these within regional or global governance regimes in which decision-making authority is in 
the hands of experts that are not politically or popularly accountable. Such efforts are often 
resisted by other coalitions, for whom this rescaling is deleterious.  
 Our case study of efforts to manage the spread of H5N1 in Indonesia clearly 
demonstrates our main contentions. The outcomes of these efforts have been shaped by the 
broader context of decentralisation, combined with the political economy of the industry 
concerned – poultry. Decentralisation has localised and fragmented patronage structures in 
Indonesia, and this has meant that maintaining the governance of lucrative economic 
activities local is crucial for maintaining these patronage relations. This in turn has made 
resistance to rescaling efforts vigorous on the part of both sections of industry and local 
politicians.  
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1 Indeed, Indonesia seemed to actively frustrate the global efforts to suppress bird flu by withholding samples of 
the virus from 2007-2011 (Hameiri, forthcoming). 
